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THE INTERNATIONAL RIGHT TO HEALTH 
CARE:  A LEGAL AND MORAL DEFENSE
Michael Da Silva*
Introduction
Scholars, politicians, and the general public alike continue to debate the 
existence of moral rights to health or health care (‘health rights’)1 and 
whether domestic laws should acknowledge such rights. Yet international 
human rights law clearly recognizes a right to health. As Stephen P. Marks 
notes, “[e]very country in the world has accepted that human rights are 
universal and is bound by at least one treaty containing a provision on the 
right to health.”2 The scope and nature of this right is contested, but the 
existence of the right as a matter of positive international human rights law 
is not.3 Given this, one may think that debate about the status of the right to 
health care in international human rights law is a non-starter. Once one 
recognizes that realizing a right to health requires health care guarantees, 
recognition of the international right to health care as part of the recognized 
international right to health should easily follow. Where fully realizing a 
right to health is likely impossible, one could further think that focusing on 
* Banting Fellow, Faculty of Law/Institute for Health and Social Policy, McGill 
University.
Thank you to Mariana Mota Prado and Nadia Lambek for pushing me on a point in a 
presentation of my other work in a manner that inspired the early parts of this paper, to my 
doctoral committee (Colleen M. Flood, Sophia Moreau, Lorraine E. Weinrib, Norman 
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organizers and audience at the 2017 Michigan Law Young Scholars’ Conference for helpful 
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1. The line between health care and other health-related goods is not always clear. 
Any definition of health care will likely admit of borderline cases. I operate here on the 
assumption that we can identify certain paradigmatic/core cases of health care. In my doctoral 
dissertation, I adopt a working definition of “health care” as “curative, diagnostic and 
preventative goods and services provided by (preferably licensed) medical, dental, allied 
health, and psychological professionals qua professionals.” Michael Da Silva, Realizing the 
Right to Health Care in Canada (2018) (unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of 
Toronto) (on file with author). This definition is imperfect (e.g., it relies on professional 
practice, which introduces a threat of circularity or too much deference to expertise), but is 
functionally useful here.
2. Stephen P. Marks, The Emergence and Scope of the Human Right to Health, in
ADVANCING THE HUMAN RIGHT TO HEALTH 3, 20 (José M. Zuniga et al. eds., 2013). While 
new states have been recognized since 2013, the general point about ubiquity remains.
3. See generally Marks, supra note 2.
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specific goods and services, including health care goods and services, is the 
only way to realistically measure realization of the right to health.4 From 
this point of view, it may seem obvious that the international right to health 
includes a right to health care as one of its constituent parts. Yet recognition 
of an international right to health care remains contentious. While the nature 
of the debate on the existence of an international right to health care differs 
from many domestic debates about health rights, a good case against the 
existence of an international right to health care can be and has been made 
even from a progressive, pro-rights perspective.
In the following, I outline the case against the international right to 
health care and explain why recognition of such a right is still necessary.
The argument is explicitly limited to international human rights law and is 
primarily descriptive in nature, but I go on to explain the moral reasons to 
accept this account. Both the positive law and moral reasoning could be 
used in other health rights debates, but I do not attempt to make such claims 
here.
The structure of my work is as follows. I first outline three problems 
with recognizing an international right to health care. Then, I present a 
defense of the right. My defense takes the form of two lines of argument. 
First, I argue that the plain text of the documents that create and interpret 
the right to health supports the idea of a right to health care. Contrary to 
critics’ claims, the relevant provisions often highlight the importance of 
particular health care goods and services and create specific obligations for 
states to provide them. The provisions explaining these requirements are 
tied not only to a concern with improved health outcomes, but also to other 
foundational norms of international human rights law, such as dignity and 
equality, which require provision of basic health care and fair distribution of 
all health care resources. In the alternative, I argue that, even if the 
international right to health does not obviously include a right to health care 
as a matter of textual interpretation, such a right can be and should be 
developed from other international rights that share the right to health care’s
foundational concerns with dignity and equality. As part of this alternative 
approach, I further argue that international law more broadly prioritizes 
health care and that recognition of an international right to health care is a 
good way of rendering international law coherent by emphasizing health 
care’s priority in another area of law. Following presentation of these 
arguments, I outline the moral value of recognizing an international right to 
health care, explain how my arguments resolve three problems with 
recognizing such a right, and address a set of lingering objections.
4. See, e.g., infra pp. 38–39 on impossibility claims. But see Amartya Sen, Elements 
of a Theory of Human Rights, 32 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 315, 348 (2004) for a contrary view on 
the feasibility point.
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I. Three Problems Facing an International Right to
Health Care
The existence of a right to health is uncontested as a matter of positive 
international human rights law. The International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights’ (the “ICESCR”) canonical definition of this 
‘international right to health’ guarantees “the right of everyone to the 
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental 
health.”5 It can be difficult to determine how to parse this phrasing. For 
instance, one can argue over whether the “highest attainable standard”
should be set at a population level (viz., duty-bearers must ensure that all 
people reach a shared standard all persons should reach) or at an individual 
level (viz., duty-bearers must ensure that all people reach the highest 
standard that it is possible for the individual persons to reach).6 Yet it is 
reasonably clear that any individual-focused view is going to require the 
standard to be tailored to individual circumstances rather than giving each 
person a right to the highest level of well-being they could possibly have; no 
one has a ‘right’ to be Superman and the state is under no duty to create 
superpeople as part of a social contract. It is also clear that the right cannot 
require all persons to reach the same level of well-being. Factors beyond the 
control of any persons will ensure some disparities. Finally, it is clear that, if 
the standard is set at a population level, the standard cannot be full health. 
Some people are going to be unhealthy. Almost all persons will be 
unhealthy by common standards at some point in their lives if they follow 
the regular human life cycle.
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (the 
“CESCR”) authoritative interpretation of the ICESCR, General Comment 
14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (the “GC 14”)
accordingly clarifies that the right “is not to be understood as a right to be 
healthy.”7 It is instead a set of freedoms and entitlements to goods and 
5. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 12, opened for 
signature Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR]. Similar phrasing appears in 
Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 24, ¶ 1, opened for signature Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter CRC]; G.A. Res. 48/104, Declaration on the Elimination of Violence 
against Women, art. 3(f) (Dec. 20, 1993) [hereinafter DEVW]; Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities art. 25, opened for signature Mar. 30, 2007, 2515 U.N.T.S. 3 
[hereinafter CRPD].
6. ICESCR, supra note 5, art. 12.
7. Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts., General Comment No. 14: The Right to the 
Highest Attainable Standard of Health, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/4 (Aug. 11, 2000) 
(emphasis in original omitted) [hereinafter GC 14].
I identify the content of the right to health and thus my proposed right to health care by 
examining treaties, customary international law, and general principles of law that discuss 
health, authoritative interpretations thereof, and documents mentioned in those interpretations. 
In so doing, I use non-binding international legal documents as sources of international law 
scholarship and guides to the content of the positive law. While one could argue that these are 
subsidiary sources and thus recognized sources of law per the terms in the Statute of the 
346 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 39:343
services,8 namely those that are “necessary for the realization of the highest 
attainable standard of health.”9 More precisely, it “must be understood as a 
right to the enjoyment of a variety of facilities, goods, services, and 
conditions necessary for the realization of the highest attainable standard of 
health.”10 Given resource constraints, it is likely the case that even this 
narrower understanding of a right to health cannot be fulfilled by any 
candidate duty-bearer. Controversies as to whether it makes sense to discuss 
a right to health as a matter of morality thus persist. It is unclear whether a 
right to health can fit the model of all rights having correlative duties (the 
‘claim-right model’).11 Yet international human rights law does not always 
require rights to be fully realizable to be recognized as legal entitlements. 
Indeed, it recognizes the problem of resource constraints and thus only 
requires immediate realization of a minimum core of social, cultural, and 
International Court of Justice art. 38, opened for signature June 26, 1945, 3 U.S.T. 1153, the 
following argument should be legally persuasive, even if one simply grants that non-binding 
declarations are valid international law documents in the absence of compliance and that 
authoritative interpretations of binding documents are evidence of how best to interpret them. 
See Da Silva, Realizing the Right to Health Care in Canada, supra note 1 for more detail on 
how I limit my sources of analysis.
The argument should, moreover, be normatively persuasive if one gives any value to 
these non-binding documents. Insofar as state practice determines how we should understand 
international rights, the fact that a majority of states recognize constitutional rights to health 
care provides some support for the view that states believe they are bound to fulfill an 
international right to health care. See PATRICK MACKLEM, THE SOVEREIGNTY OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS 63–64 (2015) on the general ‘internal’ normativity of human rights. The differing 
structures between constitutional rights across the world and between constitutional rights and 
the international right features in authoritative interpretations provides reason to question this 
view. But see Lisa Forman et al., Conceptualising Minimum Core Obligations under the Right 
to Health: How Should We Define and Implement the ‘Morality of the Depths,’ 20 INT’L J.
HUM. RTS. 531 (2016) for possible convergence. My argument is not fundamentally based on 
state practice. But it does suggest that reading the right to health as entailing a right to health 
care makes international law better cohere with transnational norms, which could be read as a 
state practice argument.
8. Henceforth, ‘goods’ should be read as encapsulating ‘goods and services’ absent 
indications to the contrary.
9. GC 14, supra note 7, ¶ 9.
10. Id.
11. For that model, see Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal 
Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913); Wesley Newcomb 
Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710
(1917). For the standard status of this model, see, for example, Hugh Upton, Right-Based 
Morality and Hohfeld’s Relations, 4 J. ETHICS 237 (2000). For the criticism that health rights 
cannot fit the model, which would actually undermine the broader right to health too, see, for 
example, Gopal Sreenivasan, A Human Right to Health? Some Inconclusive Scepticism, 86 
ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y SUPPLEMENTARY VOLUME 239 (2012).
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economic rights (including the right to health) and progressive realization of 
the other elements of the rights.12
While even the international right to health may not fit the traditional 
claim-right model of rights, the international right still exists and has a 
structure that allows one to measure its realization. It is a right to goods 
necessary for attaining the highest attainable level of health. Realization of 
the minimum core of the right should ensure that all people meet some 
standard, which may not be the highest one attainable. Progressive 
realization should eventually bring all people to the highest standard 
attainable since that is the required content of the right.13 We can then 
measure how nations provide the necessary goods. But these goods are 
instrumental to an outcome. We can thus also study the extent to which 
providing these goods meets the ultimate desired outcome, namely ensuring 
all persons reach this highest attainable standard of well-being. In each case, 
we are interested in maximizing the number of individuals who meet each 
standard, suggesting that the population-focused interpretation of the right is 
ultimately more consonant with the ICESCR’s canonical definition.14
Based on the canonical definition and its attendant framework, it may 
seem obvious that the international right to health includes a right to health 
care as one of its constituent parts. Surely health care goods are necessary 
for realization of the highest attainable standard of health! Even GC 14 
skips this explanation, assuming that readers will understand that there is a 
right to health care as part of the non-justiciable right to health and going on 
to explain that the right to health also includes rights to social determinants 
of health.15 The existence of the international right to health care is assumed 
to be so obvious that only the international right to the social determinants 
of health requires explanation.
12. Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts., General Comment No. 3: The Nature of 
States Parties’ Obligations, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. E/1991/23 (Dec. 14, 1990) [hereinafter GC 3]; GC 
14, supra note 7, ¶¶ 30, 43–45.
13. See ICESCR, supra note 5, art. 12; GC 14, supra note 7, ¶ 9.
14. This point is further reinforced by the emphasis on social determinants of health 
discussed below.
15. GC 14, supra note 7, ¶ 4. Social determinants of health can be understood as causal 
contributors to health. Social determinants of health are legion and include safe and healthy 
working conditions, a healthy environment, and housing. On this broad definition, health care 
qualifies as a social determinant. For present purposes, I understand the social determinant as 
the non-health care-related components of the right. As noted below, infra note 25,
international human rights law recognizes the social determinants as being distinct from 
health care. So, my distinction here is necessary to explain the relevant legal phenomena. 
Barbara Wilson, Social Determinants of Health from a Rights-Based Perspective, in
REALIZING THE RIGHT TO HEALTH 60, 62 (Andrew Clapham et al. eds., 2009) provides a 
longer list of social determinants and a discussion of their status in international human rights 
law. Her text is also an example of scholarly use of the social determinants/health care 
distinction I use here.
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Proponents of an international right to health care nonetheless face at 
least three difficulties that jointly present a strong case against recognition 
of such a right. They must address these difficulties if they are going to 
justify and persuasively advocate for the international right to health care.
A. International Human Rights Law Focuses on Social Determinants
First, while the legal documents granting and specifying the content of 
the right to health refer to health care goods and services, the majority of the 
right’s attendant duties relate to the social determinants of health. After its 
canonical definition, the second sub-clause of the ICESCR’s articulation of 
the right to health goes on to state that:
The steps to be taken by the States Parties to the present Covenant to 
achieve the full realization of this right shall include those necessary for:
(a) The provision for the reduction of the stillbirth-rate and of 
infant mortality and for the healthy development of the child;
(b) The improvement of all aspects of environmental and industrial 
hygiene;
(c) The prevention, treatment and control of epidemic, endemic, 
occupational and other diseases;
(d) The creation of conditions which would assure to all medical 
service and medical attention in the event of sickness.16
Condition (d) is related to health care. Conditions (a) and (c) may require 
some health care provision. Yet (a) and (c) also require provision of the 
social determinants of health, and (b) is only related to social determinants. 
Duties to provide all four apparently only exist insofar as they are 
instrumental to fulfilling a greater duty to realize health and, as the second 
problem below makes clear, (d) may be least effective in fulfilling this 
instrumental role and thus lowest priority in this list.
This list is, moreover, non-exhaustive. Other documents highlight the 
importance of the social determinants of health even more explicitly. The 
authoritative interpretation of the right to health explicitly states that food 
and shelter form part of the non-derogable core obligations states must 
provide regardless of resource constraints.17 While it also states that 
16. ICESCR, supra note 5, art. 12, ¶ 2.
17. GC 14, supra note 7, ¶ 43. I am skeptical of the conceptual coherence of core 
obligations as articulated in GC 14 for reasons like those in Katharine G. Young, The
Minimum Core of Economic and Social Rights: A Concept in Search of Content, 33 YALE J.
INT’L L. 113 (2008). Authoritative interpretations of positive international human rights law 
nonetheless recognize minimum core obligations. GC 14 is one such example. It discusses 
“core obligations” from ¶¶ 43–45. For more on minimal core content and a list of other 
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realization requires “functioning public health and health-care facilities, 
goods and services,” the list of facilities, goods, and services that fall under 
this banner primarily focuses on social determinants.18 Only one class of 
traditional health care goods is listed:
The precise nature of the facilities, goods and services will vary 
depending on numerous factors, including the State party’s
developmental level. They will include, however, the underlying 
determinants of health, such as safe and potable drinking water and 
adequate sanitation facilities, hospitals, clinics and other health-
related buildings, trained medical and professional personnel 
receiving domestically competitive salaries, and essential drugs, as 
defined by the WHO [World Health Organization] Action 
Programme on Essential Drugs[.]19
While there are also passages suggesting that the right entails a right to 
maternal and infant care, the passage in GC 14 is conditional: the goal is to 
reduce maternal mortality and stillbirth, and this goal “may be understood”
as requiring certain forms of health care.20 It is plausible to think that it may 
be so understood only when those forms of health care actually contribute to 
such outcomes. Other bodies addressing similar concerns under the right to 
health also emphasize the need to realize social determinants of health. For 
instance, the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against 
Women calls on States to provide “timely access” to family planning 
services,21 which may not easily fit under the health care umbrella. General 
Assembly resolutions and political declarations alike commonly stress the 
importance of social determinants.22
Even international human rights law documents that highlight the 
importance of health care often end up collapsing the distinction between 
health care and social determinants of health in a way that supports reading 
the right to health as fundamentally concerned with the social 
determinants.23 For instance, Steven D. Jamar describes the “international 
references to the term in authoritative interpretations of international law, see, e.g., Forman et 
al., supra note 7.
18. GC 14, supra note 7, ¶ 12.
19. Id.
20. Id. at ¶ 14.
21. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Rep. on the Work of 
Its Twentieth and Twenty-First Sessions U.N. Doc. A/54/38/Rev.1, at 7 (1999).
22. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 63/33, Global Health and Foreign Policy (Dec. 6, 2012) 
[hereinafter Global Health]; World Health Org. [WHO], Rio Political Declaration on Social 
Determinants of Health, in World Conference on the Social Determinants of Health, Meeting 
Report, annex A, at 48 (Oct. 21, 2011), http://www.who.int/sdhconference/resources/
Conference_Report.pdf (last visited Oct. 4, 2018).
23. For present purposes, the sources of international law include international 
agreements, customary international law, general principles of law, and subsidiary sources, 
including authoritative interpretations of the first three sources and expert scholarly work and 
350 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 39:343
sense” of health care as including “at least public health, sanitation, 
occupational and environmental conditions, education and nutrition, as well 
as medical treatment.”24 This is an error. International human rights law 
recognizes sanitation et al., as social determinants of health and 
distinguishes them from health care.25 But Jamar’s error is an easy one to 
make. The documents outlining the international right to health do not 
prioritize traditional medicinal or even public health goods that most 
commonly fit under the label of ‘health care.’ Rather, they recognize a 
variety of social determinants of health as key to realizing the right to 
health.
Insofar as one is partial to recognizing an international right to health 
care, it is natural to adopt a broader definition of health care that includes 
these social determinants. International human rights law even collapses the 
distinction at times. For instance, both the Declaration of Alma-Ata and the 
WHO’s specific examples of what is included in primary health care include 
social determinants like education and water,26 blurring the line between 
health care and social determinants and supporting Jamar. Yet GC 14, for 
one, recognizes the social determinants of health as distinct from health 
care.27 The Constitution of the WHO, in turn, explicitly states that 
governments must provide “adequate health and social measures.”28 This 
conjunction suggests that health measures and social measures are distinct, 
and each is recognized as a necessary government means to fulfill an end of 
improved health. International human rights law more broadly, then, 
distinguishes health care and the social determinants of health. But even text 
supporting the right to health care can be read as actually supporting a
broader set of goods, primarily consisting of social determinants.
Passages of international human rights law emphasizing the 
interconnectedness of all rights likewise provide a textual case against the 
international right to health care. International human rights law states that 
all human rights are “indivisible.”29 Many social determinants of health, 
reports on same; Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 7, art. 38. While I am 
aware of the debates about the sources of international law, untangling the issues in those 
debates is orthogonal to the present task (particularly given my focus on positive international 
law as it currently exists).
24. Steven D. Jamar, The International Human Right to Health, 22 S.U. L. REV. 1, 4–5
(1994).
25. See, e.g., GC 14, supra note 7, ¶ 9.
26. Int’l Conf. on Primary Health Care, Declaration of Alma-Ata, art. VII, U.N. Doc. 
CF/HST/1985-034/Anx.04/07 (Sept. 12, 1978) [hereinafter Declaration of Alma-Ata]; Jamar, 
supra note 24, at 47; GC 14, supra note 7, ¶¶ 43–44.
27. GC 14, supra note 7, ¶ 4.
28. Const. of the WHO, pmbl., 14 U.N.T.S. 185 (July 22, 1946).
29. The first major statement of this indivisibility is the Int’l Conf. on Hum. Rts., 
Proclamation of Teheran, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.32/41 (May 13, 1968) (see especially ¶ 13).
The indivisibility was further established by more authoritative and binding statements of 
international human rights law. It is now even included in arguable boilerplate in the 
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including education and water, are also standalone international rights.30
Where rights are indivisible as a matter of positive international human 
rights law, recognition of a right in one international human rights law 
document is evidence of its existence as a component of another right. Such 
evidence is lacking in the case of the right to health care. There is no 
standalone right to health care outside of the passages articulating the right 
to health (and/or passages articulating other related, explicitly recognized 
rights).
Arguments for health justice outside of international law similarly 
highlight the importance of social determinants of health in a way that could 
impact the persuasiveness and value of any right to health care in 
international law. Jennifer Prah Ruger, for one, suggests that health 
functioning and agency, which require more than just health care provision, 
should be the focus of our moral deliberations and that access to health care 
is valuable only to the extent that it promotes functioning and agency.31 Per 
Ruger, governments accordingly ought to provide “the social conditions in 
which all individuals have the capability to be healthy” as a matter of 
justice.32 Even if one brackets Ruger’s broader commitments to functioning 
and agency and focuses just on being healthy, such conditions are clearly 
broader than access to health care, partly for reasons described below. 
Health care itself is not a “social condition,” and “living in a nation with a 
functioning health care system” is only one of many conditions that create 
this capability. Even traditional champions of health care justice, like 
Norman Daniels, now emphasize the importance of the social determinants 
of health for distributive justice more generally.33 Insofar as secondary 
sources are authorities in international human rights law,34 the fact that 
moral arguments for health rights focus on social determinants can be taken 
as evidence against the existence of an international right to health.35 This 
beginning of human rights documents. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 64/292, The Human Right to 
Water and Sanitation (Aug. 3, 2010). For good critical analysis of the indivisibility of human 
rights, including some history, see, for example, MACKLEM, supra note 7, at 63–64; DANIEL 
J. WHELAN, INDIVISIBLE HUMAN RIGHTS: A HISTORY (2010); James W. Nickel, Rethinking 
Indivisibility: Towards a Theory of Supporting Relations Between Human Rights, 30 Hum. 
Rts. Q. 984 (2008).
30. The right to education is featured in ICESCR, supra note 5, arts. 13–14. For the 
documents outlining the international right to water, see, for example, Hum. Rts. Council, 
Rep. of the United Nations High Comm’r for Hum. Rts. on the Scope and Content of the 
Relevant Hum. Rts. Obligations Related to Equitable Access to Safe Drinking Water and
Sanitation Under Int’l Hum. Rts. Instruments, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/6/3 (2007).
31. JENNIFER PRAH RUGER, HEALTH AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 36, 134 (2009).
32. Id. at 134.
33. NORMAN DANIELS, JUST HEALTH: MEETING HEALTH NEEDS FAIRLY (2008).
34. Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 7, art. 38.
35. International human rights law-specific arguments prioritizing the social 
determinants of health like Jamar, supra note 24, arguably have an even stronger claim to be 
sources of international law. I do not repeat my discussion of such sources here, but the fact 
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suggests that any international right to health care will have limited scope at 
best.
B. Increased Access to Health Care Does Not (Maximally) Correlate 
with the Normative Goals of the Right to Health
Where Ruger (like Daniels) discusses health justice rather than 
international human rights law, her claims may be even more persuasive 
evidence for the second challenge facing the purported international right to 
health care.36 In short, second, the normativity of the international right to 
health is tied to the importance of certain benchmarks and indicators of 
health across populations, but recognition of health rights and access to 
health care do not strongly correlate with improved health outcomes (at 
least when compared to many social determinants). This suggests that the 
normativity of the international right to health may not justify an 
international right to health care.
The textual problem above already highlights the fact that seeming 
international rights to health care appear to exist only as they are 
instrumental to realization of the right to health. Yet health care does not 
appear to be a strong causal factor in achieving good health, at least when 
compared with many social determinants of health. The purely instrumental 
rights to health care goods will be severely limited if they cannot fulfill their 
instrumental aims. Scientific and social scientific data suggests that they are 
(at minimum comparatively) weak contributors to good health. Daniel 
Callahan outlines this general point well:
It has long been known that it is not high technology, cure-oriented 
medicine that best promotes population health. Instead, public 
health measures and socioeconomic improvement accounted for 
most of the reduction of mortality over the past century. That 
knowledge should lead to an obvious conclusion: goals and 
priorities oriented to population health should, in general, have the 
highest place in health care, in research, and in health policy.37
This is not statistical data. Moreover, even Callahan thinks that more things 
matter than just mortality. He identifies several goals of health care in a 
form of non-rights-based value pluralism.38 Yet Callahan’s charge against 
the causal role of medicine in good health undermines the potential for any 
purported right to medicinal health care.
that international human rights law scholars emphasize the importance of the social 
determinants can also play a role in this prong of the case against the international right to 
health care.
36. See RUGER, supra note 31. For Daniels, see supra note 33.
37. Daniel Callahan, Ends and Means: The Goals of Health Care, in ETHICAL 
DIMENSIONS OF HEALTH POLICY 3, 15 (Marion Danis et al. eds., 2002).
38. See generally id.
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Even if, like Callahan,39 one includes public health as part of health 
care, it is clear that many other social determinants are even more important 
than health care. Articles in a special issue of Perspectives in Biology and 
Medicine, an interdisciplinary health journal, outlined several good 
examples. For example, one’s place in the social status appears to 
substantially impact health. The “social gradient” is common throughout the 
world and across populations.40 It is unclear if and how health care 
contributes to these and other inequities.41 Increased “physiological capital,”
the physical capacity to perform certain tasks, similarly has historically had 
a greater impact on reducing health inequalities than has increased access to 
health care.42 This is primarily because it reduces “socioeconomic 
disparities in the burden of disease.”43 According to Robert W. Fogel, this 
supports the view that “environmental improvement is more important than 
access to health care.”44 Other significant factors affecting one’s health 
include one’s neighborhood45 and social isolation.46 Access to medicine 
correlates less strongly with improved health. Public health initiatives may 
correlate somewhat better, but other social determinants appear even more 
important to realizing the highest attainable standard of health.
The obvious response to this second problem is to state that, even if it is 
true that other factors better correlate with improved health, it is wrong to 
ignore the impact that health care, particularly public health but even 
medicine, has on health outcomes. Health care, in other words, is 
39. Per Callahan: “Medicine is the historically prior institution, and its goals in practice 
determined for many centuries what health care became available . . . . With the advent of a 
public health perspective much later, and then of organized social and political systems 
designed to improve health by deploying both medicine and public health, it became possible 
to speak of health care as the generic category for all efforts, medical or otherwise, to protect 
and foster good health. Nonetheless, even if medicine can now be subsumed under the broader 
category of health care, its scientific knowledge and ability to determine . . . the biological 
pathways of disease give it a central role in health care. Medicine remains the fundamental 
discipline of health care.” Id. at 6.
He notes that the distinctions between medicine and public health do not create 
“anything close to air-tight compartments. Like all typologies, this one [distinguishing the two 
and their respective goals] is meant to put the world into some kind of order; and the world, as 
always, is not nearly so accommodating as are our invented categories.” Id. at 8.
40. Michael G. Marmot, Understanding Social Inequalities in Health, 46 PERSP.
BIOLOGY & MED. S9, S9 (2003).
41. Id. at S14–S15.
42. Robert W. Fogel, Secular Trends in Physiological Capital: Implications for Equity 
in Health Care, 46 PERSP. BIOLOGY & MED. S24, S24 (2003).
43. Id. at S28.
44. Id. at S32–S33.
45. Robert J. Sampson, The Neighbourhood Context of Well-Being, 46
PERSP. BIOLOGY & MED. S53 (2003).
46. John T. Cacioppo & Louise C. Hawkley, Social Isolation and Health, with an 
Emphasis on Underlying Mechanisms, 46 PERSP. BIOLOGY & MED. S39 (2003).
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instrumentally valuable for health in absolute terms, even if it is not 
comparatively instrumentally valuable. Charles Kenny provides one of the 
best statistical arguments that human rights and development programs have 
been instrumental to improving mortality and other health outcomes 
throughout the world. He stresses that social determinants of health are 
among the most important contributors to these improvements, but he also 
states that increased access to vaccines played a foundational role.47
Callahan’s challenge, in turn, was lodged against the backdrop of traditional 
biases toward individual health care.48 He worried that rising health care 
costs, in particular in the pharmaceutical domain, were tied to this emphasis 
on the individual.49 Yet he too ultimately recognized the continued 
importance of health care even as he called for increased emphasis on the 
social determinants of health:
A final motivation for a reexamination of the goals of health care 
would be to take better account of the increasing knowledge of the 
socioeconomic determinants of health. As matters now stand, 
medical treatments and cures are sought for many health conditions 
that might be greatly reduced by such nonmedical strategies as 
improvements in education, employment, and the environment. The 
traditional medical goal of treating the sick would remain, but a 
great emphasis would fall not only on public health but also on 
improving those social conditions known to affect health.50
Elsewhere, he states that social determinants demand a “role in health 
policy, even though they are outside health care systems as customarily 
understood,”51 which is consistent with seeing them as distinct means of 
trying to achieve the same end.
Other scholars mentioned above have likewise seemed to recognize 
some value in health care. Proponents of community-wide interventions to 
address neighborhood-related issues recognize that those can complement 
individually-focused policies (though some do not go as far as to say that 
health care provision programs will do so).52 Much of Fogel’s data focuses 
on curative medicine as being equivalent to health care, but certain forms of 
47. CHARLES KENNY, GETTING BETTER: WHY GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT IS 
SUCCEEDING—AND HOW WE CAN IMPROVE THE WORLD EVEN MORE (2011).
48. Callahan, supra note 37, at 15, identifies this bias in the American context in the 
context of his argument for greater emphasis on the social determinants of health.
49. Id. at 16–17.
50. Id. at 8. Callahan actually links my critique of Jamar and Ruger’s concerns. He 
states that, even if one rightly recognizes that socioeconomic conditions “should surely enter 
into any broad scheme of health care,” one can more narrowly define health care, focusing 
primarily, in the ordinary cases that motivate the bulk of health law and policy, on public 
health and medicine. Id. at 4; see also id. at 8, 13.
51. Id. at 6.
52. Sampson, supra note 45, at S61–S62.
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neonatal care that he emphasizes as important are plausibly understood as 
health care.53 So, even Fogel seems to recognize the import of some kinds of 
health care. He also ultimately acknowledges that health care outreach 
programs are important (though primarily because they can help out with 
environmental factors). Finally, social isolation too has a significant impact 
on health.54 There are indications that capitalism itself partly contributes to 
increased social isolation.55 Few would warrant reordering the social 
structure for this alone, particularly given that the right to health is supposed 
to be consistent with all forms of government. But even proponents of 
drastic changes, such as the end of capitalism, recognize that preventative 
medicine and palliative care would be helpful incremental improvements.56
Everyone seems to agree that providing some health care can have positive 
outcomes. An argument from authority can thus help address this second 
concern.
Even leaving these authorities aside, moreover, comparative analysis of 
the relative contributions of health care and social determinants of health to 
health outcomes does not undermine the claim that a right to health care is 
valuable. The easy response to the second challenge, then, is just to grant 
weak correlation between health care and health outcomes (at least when 
compared to the correlative between the social determinants of health and 
health outcomes) and state that some correlation is all that is necessary. The
right to health care here will be as limited as the causal connections between 
health and health care, but it will still exist.
There is, however, a version of this argument that is more damning for 
proponents of the right to health care. Much of the concern here appears to 
be that recognizing a right to health care will lead to poor priorities. This is 
an international equivalent of the concerns that domestic constitutional 
rights are too easily “co-opted.”57 Much of the data supporting the primacy 
of the social determinants of health is comparative in nature.58 If the 
forgoing is true, the data does not prove that there cannot or should not be a 
right to health care when looked at in isolation. Yet recognition of a right to 
health care can lead to outsized spending on expensive health care goods. 
Actual recognition of such rights in the domestic sphere often leads to 
increased health care for middle class individuals and does not improve the 
health of the worst-off members of society.59 Too many people accordingly 
53. E.g., Fogel, supra note 42, at S34.
54. Cacioppo & Hawkley, supra note 46.
55. Id. at S50.
56. Id. at S50–S51.
57. See the sources in note 59 below.
58. See, for instance, notes 52–54 and the surrounding text.
59. For example, this appears to be true in Brazil. Armando De Negri Filho, Brazil: A 
Long Journey Towards a Universal Healthcare System, in ADVANCING THE HUMAN RIGHT 
TO HEALTH, supra note 2, at 176; Octavio Luiz Motta Ferraz, The Right to Health in the 
Courts of Brazil: Worsening Health Inequities?, 11 HEALTH & HUM. RTS., 33 (2009); Virgilio 
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remain below the internationally guaranteed standard of health, while others 
access goods needed to reach a higher level. Talking about an international 
right to health care, even as a component of a broader right to health, may 
thus confuse the public into thinking they have expansive health care 
entitlements under international law and that governments must spend a 
great deal on more expensive goods. This could lead to less funding for the 
social determinants of health that actually correlate well with increased 
health.
One should, on this view, thus only talk of a right to health. Any 
claimed entitlements to health care goods should be explicitly discussed in 
terms of their proven impact on achieving the internationally guaranteed 
standard of health. Determining whether they are actually entitlements as 
part of the right should include a comparative analysis to see if the right 
would be better achieved by other social determinants to avoid misplaced 
priorities that do not accord with the normative goal of increased well-
being. Such comparative analysis will often auger in favor of the social 
determinants of health. The health care component of the international right 
to health will thus be limited. It will include vaccines, given Kenny’s
aforementioned data,60 but the remaining scope of the right will be limited. 
It will also be difficult to identify ex ante, undermining the action-guiding 
nature of an international right to health care. If the scope of the right is only 
determinable in comparative contextual analyses, there will be little room to 
identify the scope of any purported right to health care as a component of 
the right to health simply by reading the relevant international documents 
outside of particular contexts where particular funding decisions need to be 
made. Explicitly setting out the content of the right in legislation will be 
impossible since the scope will always be context-dependent. Current 
provisions requiring specific goods will lack justification since many of the 
health care goods guaranteed under international human rights law do not 
contribute to improved health more than the social determinants.61 This 
version of the second problem cannot be solved by just pointing to the fact 
that some health care goods do improve health, even if no one disagrees 
with that claim.
C. The Purported International Right to Health Care Does Not Fit the 
Structure of International Human Rights
Finally, very few international rights require states to create full 
systems to realize rights, and international human rights law that supports a 
Alfonso da Silva & Fernanda Vargas Terrazas, Claiming the Right to Health in Brazilian 
Courts: The Exclusion of the Already Excluded?, 36 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 825 (2011). But see
César Rodríguez-Garavito, Beyond the Courtroom: The Impact of Judicial Activism on 
Socioeconomic Rights in Latin America, 89 TEX. L.R. 1669 (2011).
60. Kenny, supra note 47.
61. See infra pp. 18–21 for examples of these goods.
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right to health care seems to require states to create health care systems. 
This presents a mismatch between the purported international right to health 
care and the structure of international human rights generally.
International human rights law contains a requirement for a functioning 
health care system as part of the right to health.62 Other passages further 
express the need for both a functioning health care system and a legal 
framework that defends it. The entitlements in GC 14 “include the right to a 
system of health protection which provides equality of opportunity for 
people to enjoy the highest attainable level of health.”63 While legislation is 
just one option among many for most social rights, the CESCR states that 
“[i]n fields such as health . . . legislation may also be an indispensable 
element for many purposes.”64 Some statutory protection of the health care 
system seems necessary.65 A further requirement for a fair system for health 
care allocation can be derived from international human rights law’s
commitment to non-discrimination in decision-making. Per international 
human rights law, a fair process for identifying the rights to which one 
should be entitled must ensure that decisions are made free from 
discriminatory intent and do not have discriminatory effect. It must then 
ensure that whatever goods it selects are distributed in a method that ensures
equality of opportunity. For example, the ICESCR’s references to the “equal 
and inalienable rights of all” and the rights of “everyone” are read as 
reflecting the foundational values of equality and non-discrimination.66 This 
has implications for the structure of the selection process and its 
implementation. Whatever the result of the process in terms of the range of 
goods covered, persons must have equal opportunity to receive their fair 
share. A functioning health care system is needed to provide them.
Still, other passages require national policies and strategies for realizing 
the right. The Declaration of Alma-Ata states that “governments should 
formulate national policies, strategies and plans of action to launch and 
sustain primary health care as part of a comprehensive national health 
system.”67 GC 14 takes this further and states that the obligation to fulfill the 
right to health includes a requirement to “give sufficient recognition to the 
right to health in the national political and legal systems, preferably by way 
62. Rio Declaration, supra note 22, at 48, ¶ 7.
63. GC 14, supra note 7, ¶ 8.
64. GC 3, supra note 12, ¶ 3.
65. See, e.g., Comm. on the Rts. of the Child, General Comment No. 15 (2013) on the 
Right of the Child to the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of Health, ¶ 94, U.N. 
Doc. CRC/C/GC/15 (Apr. 17, 2013).
66. ICESCR, supra note 5, pmbl.; Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts., General 
Comment No. 20: Non-Discrimination in Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ¶ 3, U.N. 
Doc. E/C.12/GC/20 (July 2, 2009).
67. Declaration of Alma-Ata, supra note 26, art. VIII.
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of legislative implementation, and to adopt a national health policy with a 
detailed plan for realizing the right to health.”68
International human rights law, then, appears to require a system for 
distributing health care in a fair manner that is (preferably) legislatively-
protected and a national policy for distributing health care. This is 
demanding and does not accord with the structure of other international 
rights. Other international human rights do not entail duties to establish 
systems of distribution or protection or national strategies or policies. 
Social, economic, and cultural rights uncontroversially entail obligations of 
conduct and result.69 Such obligations require states to respect, protect, and 
fulfill the rights.70 Fulfilling the rights will often require creating systems of 
rights protection and sometimes even systems of distribution. But the 
explicit requirement to create a formal system for distributing goods under 
the right to health is not a universal or even common feature of international 
human rights. The right to food, for instance, does not entail explicit duties 
to establish food distribution services.71 The right to education requires 
some education system to be realized, but it is not explicitly placed in the 
category of goods requiring legislative protection of a system that provides 
it. International human rights law is generally agnostic on how nations 
realize rights, partly due to its concern with ensuring that rights can be 
realized in a nation with any form of government.72 Other rights also tend 
not to require full national implementation policies.73
The purported right to health care thus seems to fit uneasily with the 
structure of international rights. Stating that a broad right to health must 
include a narrower right to health care is an insufficient response to these 
concerns. If the narrow right actually demands more than other broad rights, 
this suggests a lack of fit between the narrow right and the broader rights 
that are clearly part of the order it seeks to join.
68. GC 14, supra note 7, ¶ 36.
69. GC 3, supra note 12, ¶ 1.
70. This point is widely recognized. See, e.g., Daniel Tarantola, Global Justice and
Human Rights: Health and Human Rights in Practice, 1 GLOBAL JUST. 11, 12 (2007); Scott 
Leckie & Anne Gallagher, Introduction, in ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: A
LEGAL RESOURCE GUIDE xx (Scott Leckie & Anne Gallagher, eds. 2006).
71. Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts., General Comment No. 12: The Right to 
Adequate Food, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1999/5 (May 12, 1999) [hereinafter Food GC].
72. E.g., GC 3, supra note 12, ¶ 8; Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts., General 
Comment No. 9: The Domestic Application of the Covenant, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1998/24 
(Dec. 3, 1998).
73. Indeed, international human rights law’s purported consistency with federalism and 
general agnosticism about forms of government is directly opposed to federal intervention 
requirements. For application of this agnosticism in the ICESCR context, see GC 3, supra
note 12, ¶ 8 and Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights, General Comment 9: The 
Domestic Application of the Covenant, ¶ 5, UN Doc E/C.12/1998/24 (1998) [hereinafter GC 
9].
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D. Conclusion
The problems facing the international right to health care, then, are 
clear. But I believe they are surmountable. In this work, I accordingly 
defend the international right to health care on textual and theoretical 
grounds. If successful, this defense will address all three of these issues with 
existing accounts.
II. The Textual Argument
The first two problems facing the international right to health care have 
textual origins. The text of positive international human rights law
highlights the importance of social determinants of health and establishes a 
normative goal for the right to health that is best achieved by ensuring the 
social determinants of health rather than health care.
Luckily for proponents of the international right to health care, a more 
expansive survey of the relevant international human rights law documents 
provides a defense against both criticisms. The plain text of the documents 
that create and interpret the right to health supports the idea of a right to 
health care as one of its components. Contrary to social determinants-
focused critics’ claims, the relevant provisions often highlight the 
importance of particular health care goods and create specific obligations 
for states to provide those goods that cannot be reduced to purely functional 
commitments to goods that maximize health outcomes.
The statements from the ICESCR and the Declaration of Alma-Ata and 
interpretations thereof do not exhaust the statements on the scope of the 
right to health. Many other passages in international human rights law also 
articulate health care entitlements as part of the right to health. The 
Declaration of Alma-Ata is itself focused on primary health care. It actually 
followed a conference explicitly devoted to that topic. It states that a
main social target of governments, international organizations and 
the whole world community in the coming decades should be the 
attainment by all peoples of the world by the year 2000 of a level of 
health that will permit them to lead a socially and economically 
productive life. Primary health care is the key to attaining this 
target as part of development in the spirit of social justice.74
The global community failed to meet this goal, but the Declaration’s
commitment to primary health care in setting that goal should not be 
ignored. Primary health care is central throughout international human 
rights law.75 Providing “essential” primary health care is one of the first 
74. Declaration of Alma-Ata, supra note 26, art. V.
75. Fellow right to health care proponent David Beetham suggests that agreement on 
primary health care is also part of a consensus among economists and human rights theorists 
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minimum core obligations under the ICESCR’s right to health.76 Primary 
health care provision is also listed as a core obligation under the child’s
right to health.77
Moving beyond primary health care, other documents, including the 
earliest modern human rights documents, also emphasize the role of health 
care, including medicinal health care, as components of the international 
right to health. The earliest modern international human rights law 
document, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (the “UDHR”), 
includes a right to “a standard of living adequate for the health and well-
being of himself and of his family, including . . . medical care.”78 Provision 
of essential medicines is, in turn, prioritized in GC 14.79 A right thereto can 
also be gleaned from section 15 of the ICESCR, which grants a right to 
benefit from scientific advances.80 Still other statements of positive 
international human rights law explicitly list goods or types of goods that 
should be covered. GC 14 states that fulfilling the right requires 
“immunization programmes against the major infectious diseases.”81 The 
Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women mentions 
“safeguarding of the function of reproduction” as part of its “right to 
protection of health” and states that parties “shall ensure to women 
appropriate services in connection with pregnancy, confinement and the 
post-natal period, granting free services where necessary, as well as 
adequate nutrition during pregnancy and lactation.”82 While nutrition may 
be a social determinant of health, health care services are distinguishable 
from (or as) social determinants. The Convention on the Rights of the Child
says parties must “take appropriate measures” to provide “necessary 
medical assistance and health care . . . with emphasis on the development of 
primary health care,” “appropriate pre-natal and post-natal care for 
about the minimal content of the right to health care; David Beetham, What Future for Social 
and Economic Rights?, 43 POL. STUD. 40 (1995).
76. GC 3, supra note 12, ¶ 10.
77. Comm. on the Rts. of the Child, supra note 65, ¶ 73.
78. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 25 (Dec. 10, 
1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
79. GC 14, supra note 7, ¶ 17.
80. See Stephen P. Marks, Access to Essential Medicines as a Component of the Right 
to Health, in REALIZING THE RIGHT TO HEALTH, supra note 15, at 87. But see id. at 93 where 
he suggests the right is primarily “derivative” from rights to health and life. Marks suggests 
elsewhere that international intellectual property law may be at odds with international human 
rights law’s commitment to essential medicines in some respects. See also Stephen P. Marks 
& Adriana L. Benedict, Access to Medical Products, Vaccines, and Medical Technologies” in
REALIZING THE RIGHT TO HEALTH 305. I address parts of this concern below. See infra Part 
III of this work for an argument that international trade law, including international 
intellectual property and patent law, actually highlights the importance of health care.
81. GC 14, supra note 7, ¶ 36.
82. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 
arts. 11–12, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter CEDAW].
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mothers,” and “preventative health care.”83 The Convention of the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities states that parties “shall take all appropriate 
measures to ensure access . . . [to services] including health-related 
rehabilitation.”84 Many international human rights law documents explicitly 
create entitlements to health care.
Even documents establishing the importance of the social determinants 
of health and outlining the social determinant-related content of the right to 
health highlight the importance of certain health care goods. For instance, 
United Nations General Assembly Resolution 63/33: Global Health and 
Foreign Policy lists universal health coverage as a determinant of health that 
must be considered when fulfilling the right to health, implicitly including 
health care as an important component of the right to health.85 More 
explicitly, the WHO’s World Conference on the Social Determinants of 
Health repeatedly mentioned the importance of health care. Health care did 
not come up in every session of the conference, but it came up in multiple 
sessions.86 The conference was also understood as building on the earlier 
health-care-focused conference at Alma-Ata, suggesting a continuity of 
interest between primary health care concerns and social determinants of 
health as aspects of the right to health care.87 One of the five themes of the 
World Conference on the Social Determinants of Health was explicitly 
defined in terms of a need for “universal health care coverage that is 
accessible, affordable and of good quality” and the official explanation of 
the theme stated that health care services “are essential to the enjoyment” of 
the right to health.88 The resulting Rio Declaration on the Social 
Determinants of Health in World Health accordingly pledged that 
signatories’ health care systems would “promote access to high-quality, 
promotive, preventative, curative and rehabilitative health services 
throughout the life cycle, with a particular focus on comprehensive and 
integrated primary health care.”89
We must take the text of international human rights law at its word 
when it says that there are health care goods to which persons and groups 
are entitled under international human rights law. There is nothing to 
suggest that the health care goods listed in the relevant documents are more 
closely connected with health outcomes than are alternatives (vaccines 
notwithstanding). Simply limiting the list of goods required by international 
83. CRC, supra note 5, art. 24, ¶¶ 2(b), (d), (f).
84. CRPD, supra note 5, art. 25.
85. Global Health, supra note 22.
86. WHO, World Conference on the Social Determinants of Health: Summary Report 
(2012) [hereinafter WHO, Summary]; Rio Declaration, supra note 22.
87. WHO, World Conference on the Social Determinants of Health, Meeting Report: 
All for Equity (2012), at ix; Rio Declaration, supra note 22, at 48, ¶ 3.
88. Id. at 50; WHO, Summary, supra note 86, at 3.
89. Rio Declaration, supra note 22, at 50.
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human rights law to those that are proven to be instrumentally valuable for 
health will not explain the existing list of entitlements that the law 
recognizes, particularly if this instrumental value must be determined in 
comparison with social determinants of health as required by the second 
problem above. International human rights law promises a lot more than just 
vaccines.90 Essential medicines, as articulated by the WHO for the purposes 
of international human rights law, include a wide variety of health care 
goods.91 Not all of them are goods for which improved access thereto 
strongly correlates with improved health, particularly across populations.
The best explanation for the continued recognition of, for instance, 
essential medicines as part of the textually supported health care component 
of the right to health is, I think, that these goods are highlighted for other 
reasons. These reasons may include realization of other international human 
rights, including equality rights, and commitments to the values underlying 
the international human rights law regime, such as dignity.
Dignity is the lynchpin of international human rights law. The first 
sentence of the UDHR begins with “recognition of the inherent dignity” of 
all persons, and dignity is again referred to in the fourth paragraph of the 
UDHR’s preface and in its first article.92 The importance of dignity is also 
recognized in nearly every relevant international human rights law 
document.93 Other rights are explained as reflections of a broader 
commitment to dignity.94 Curative medicine guarantees may not maximize 
health across populations or even maximize the number of persons at a level 
of well-being, particularly when contrasted with social determinant 
guarantees, but curative medicine is often necessary to restore people to the 
level of well-being necessary to live a dignified existence. This helps 
explain the essential medicine commitments above.
Equality and non-discrimination serve similar foundational roles in 
international human rights law. A variety of equality guarantees appear 
90. Of course, recognition of an international human right to health care could also be 
instrumentally valuable to increased access to vaccines if states believe that they are bound by 
international human rights law. Yet many countries that recognize the existence of such do not 
provide adequate access to vaccines. This is weak evidence that recognition of an international 
right may not perfectly fulfill all the normative goals set out in Part IV. But it also stresses the 
importance of reminding nations about the need to provide vaccines without undermining the 
case that nations owe duties to provide more than just vaccines.
91. WHO Model List of Essential Medicines, 20th List, WHO, http://www.who.int/
medicines/publications/essentialmedicines/en/ (last visited Oct. 4, 2018).
92. UDHR, supra note 78, pmbl., art. 1.
93. See, e.g., AHARON BARAK, HUMAN DIGNITY: THE CONSTITUTIONAL VALUE AND 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 38–43 (Daniel Kayros ed., 2015). Barak actually claims that 
human dignity is one of international law’s general principles of law. Id. at 37.
94. Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts., General Comment No. 15: The Right to 
Water, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2002/11 (Jan. 20, 2003) [hereinafter GC 15].
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throughout international human rights law.95 Non-discrimination guarantees 
are also common.96 Health care guarantees may be necessary to ensure that 
all people receive the same level of access to health care goods that 
international human rights law deems necessary for specific health 
outcomes—such as the protection of dignity—or any other internationally 
recognized reason. This helps explain why equal access to quality health 
care goods is part of the international right to health care, why non-
discrimination in health care provision is explicitly included as part of the 
right to health, and why international human rights law requires a 
functioning health care system that distributes goods in a procedurally fair, 
non-discriminatory manner.
The international right to health care, then, is not solely normatively 
concerned with ensuring the highest attainable standard of health where 
health is understood as a high level of well-being. The criteria for further 
specifying the health care content of the right to health likewise suggests
that the strong version of the second problem above is not one that 
international human rights law seeks to solve. The list of goods above is not 
offered as an exclusive list of the health care goods to which one should be 
entitled under the right to health. The criteria for determining what else can 
be added is non-comparative with respect to social determinants. The goods 
must be effective.97 They need not be more effective than (other) social 
determinants like a health environment, education, food, or water.
The provisions outlining the importance of dignity and other interests 
and undermining the comparative reading of the content of the right to 
health also serve as links to the other arguments below. The data that 
support the textual argument here could also support the ‘coherence 
argument’ below and the values mentioned in the passages help explain the 
moral reasons that it is appropriate to recognize an international right to 
health care. I now turn to explaining the coherence argument in detail.
95. E.g., ICESCR, supra note 5, art. 3; CEDAW, supra note 82, art. 11; UDHR, supra 
note 78, pmbl., art. 1; Fourth World Conference on Women, Beijing Declaration, ¶¶ 30, 44, 
89, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.177/20, annex I (Oct. 17, 1995); Comm. on the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women, supra note 21, at 7; GC 14, supra note 7, ¶ 18.
96. E.g., Const. of the WHO, supra note 28, pmbl.; CRPD, supra note 5, art. 25; 
UDHR, supra note 78, art. 2. Equality and non-discrimination are also standalone rights 
elsewhere in the legal order. See, e.g., CRC, supra note 5, art. 2; GC 14, supra note 7, ¶ 3. 
ALLEN BUCHANAN, THE HEART OF HUMAN RIGHTS 28, 30 (2013) states that promoting 
equality (in the sense of equal standing) is a primary function of international human rights 
law in general.
97. “[H]ealth facilities, goods and services must also be scientifically and medically 
appropriate and of good quality. This requires, inter alia, skilled medical personnel, 
scientifically approved and unexpired drugs and hospital equipment, safe and potable water, 
and adequate sanitation.” GC 14, supra note 7, ¶ 12 (italicization in original).
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III. The Coherence Argument
Even if the international right to health does not obviously include a 
right to health care as a matter of textual interpretation, such a right can be 
and should be developed from other international rights that share the right 
to health care’s foundational concerns with dignity and equality. 
Interpretations of those rights support this argument. Indeed, even if the 
commitments to dignity and equality in the preceding section do not provide 
the best explanation for why international human rights law requires the 
provision of certain health care goods as part of the right to health, the 
commitments to dignity and equality explain why international human 
rights law should recognize a right to health care either as part of a broader 
right to health or as a standalone right. Again, in short, the provision of 
certain health care goods is required to ensure people can access the goods 
necessary to enjoy a dignified life and, where all nations provide some 
health care, recognizing a right to health care is a valuable means to 
ensuring equality and non-discrimination in that health care distribution 
process. From this perspective, the aforementioned indivisibility of human 
rights actually counts in favor of recognition of an international human
rights law.98 Dignity, equality, and non-discrimination rights are best 
understood as partially constituted by a right to health care and make the 
most sense when they are part of a normative order that recognizes a right to 
health care. Thus, even if dignity, equality, and non-discrimination do not 
provide a sufficient limiting principle for identifying the scope of the 
international right to health care,99 international human rights law’s
commitments to dignity, equality, and non-discrimination suggest that the 
right to health does not need to be read in a manner that is solely concerned 
with health outcomes but instead reflects commitments to many values that 
support an international right to health care.
International law that is not concerned with human rights likewise 
suggests that international law in general recognizes the primary importance 
of (and, arguably, right to) health care. International trade law, particularly 
the component of international trade law devoted to patents (‘international 
patent law’), provides the best example. Exceptions to international patent 
law suggest that it too recognizes the importance of health care and carves 
out rights to benefit from health care achievements that can plausibly be 
understood as aspects of a right to health care. At the very least, these 
exceptions establish international human rights law’s normative 
commitment to the importance of health care, which supports the coherence 
argument for an international human right to health care. Where 
98. See supra note 29.
99. For the problem of identifying a proper limiting principle, see Michael Da Silva, A
Goal-Oriented Understanding of the Right to Health Care and Its Implications for Future 
Health Rights Litigation, 39 DALHOUSIE L.J. 377 (2016); Da Silva, Realizing the Right to 
Health Care in Canada, supra note 1.
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international trade law recognizes access to health care as creating a 
constraint on the freedom to maximize general market principles, 
international trade law could also be understood as recognizing health care 
as a right that can conflict with general trade rights but must be balanced 
with trade rights and general market demands to maximize each.
The case for the international right to health care from international 
trade law is likely more surprising and thus requires more elaboration than 
the cases from dignity and equality. To begin, the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (the “GATT”) recognizes a general exception to its 
standard rules, which are designed for trade liberalization, for measures 
“necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health.”100 This 
provision on its own is consistent with a view that international law 
prioritizes health rather than health care. Indeed, the leading judicial 
interpretation of the provision is primarily concerned with health outcomes, 
and the main issue on appeal was the evidence that the subject matter of the 
case—asbestos—impacts health in a way that justifies an import ban (and, 
as an extension, whether less restrictive means could produce the same 
health outcomes).101 But the provision does establish that even international 
trade law acknowledges that certain health commitments should be capable 
of constraining international trade law’s own dominant trade liberalization 
norms. Further exceptions then appear to create space for state measures 
designed to ensure adequate health care. For instance, the same article of the 
GATT creates general exceptions for measures “involving restrictions on 
exports of domestic materials necessary to ensure essential quantities of 
such materials to a domestic processing industry during periods when the 
domestic price of such materials is held below the world price as part of a 
governmental stabilization plan” and “essential to the acquisition or 
distribution of products in general or local short supply.”102 Such provisions 
could theoretically apply to health care goods, particularly when a state fails 
to fulfill the right to health care obligations I defend throughout this piece 
due to an inability to manufacture the goods in the first case or resource 
constraints in the second.
100. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures art. 2, Apr. 
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, annex 1A, art. 
XX(b) 1867 U.N.T.S. 493.
101. Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and 
Asbestos-Containing Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS135/AB/R (adopted Apr. 5, 2001). The 
criteria for technical regulations are the other primary issue in that dispute. As noted in that 
case, for example, id. ¶¶ 113–116, 128, and in a concurring statement at para 152), the health 
impact of goods is partially constitutive of them for the purposes of a like product 
comparison. While the case goes on to suggest that states can “determine the level of 
protection of health that they consider appropriate” for the purposes of the GATT, id. ¶ 168, it 
is notable that the health exception remains, and this variance was used to allow greater health 
protections that some would have allowed under the GATT.
102. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. XX(i)–(j), Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. 
A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
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The part of international trade law focused on patents makes the 
importance of health care even clearer. Pharmaceuticals were placed under 
the international patent law regime in the Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of International Property Rights (the “TRIPS”).103 That agreement 
was designed to balance two competing goals of international law. Both 
goals are, notably, fundamentally focused on the importance of health care, 
suggesting an even greater priority for health care than the balancing 
discussed in the previous paragraph would support:
The TRIPS Agreement represents an attempt at the multilateral 
level to achieve the difficult task of balancing the interest of 
providing incentives for research and development of new drugs 
with the interest of making these drugs as widely accessible as 
possible to patients needing them.104
Only the latter goal focuses exclusively on individual access to goods and is 
plausibly understood as a reflection of the need for a right to health care. 
Yet the fact that the agreement is committed to balancing and includes 
exceptions to the TRIPS’s codified international intellectual property norms 
emphasizes the fact that international trade law recognizes the importance of 
individual access to health care and is normatively consistent with the 
existence of an international right to health care. Indeed, the guiding 
principles of the TRIPS are consistent with recognition of the importance of 
public health, which may be part of or contribute to health care.105 Article 8 
of the TRIPS thus states that:
1. Members may, in formulating or amending their laws and 
regulations, adopt measures necessary to protect public health and 
nutrition, and to promote the public interest in sectors of vital 
importance to their socio-economic and technological development, 
provided that such measures are consistent with the provisions of 
this Agreement.
2. Appropriate measures, provided that they are consistent with 
the provisions of this Agreement, may be needed to prevent the 
abuse of intellectual property rights by right holders or the resort to 
103. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 
U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS].
104. ANTONY TAUBMAN ET AL., A HANDBOOK ON THE WTO TRIPS AGREEMENT 179
(2012); Fact Sheet: TRIPS and Pharmaceutical Patents: Obligations and Exceptions,
WORLD TRADE ORG. (Sept. 2006), https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/
factsheet_pharm02_e.htm (last visited Oct. 4, 2018) [hereinafter Fact Sheet].
105. Recall the definition of health care in Callahan, supra note 37.
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practices which unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the 
international transfer of technology.106
Later interpretations of public health under the TRIPS specifically identify 
access to patented medicines as public health concerns and state that the 
TRIPS should be read in conformity with a commitment to public health.107
Yet these principles still require compliance with the TRIPS.
Further health-related exceptions emphasize the importance of health 
care in international law by providing a means to avoid the application of 
international trade law in order to increase access to health care. The TRIPS 
does not provide a blanket exception for any class of inventions, so 
pharmaceuticals and medical technologies as classes are subject to patent 
law norms that could undermine access to health care absent some other 
explicit exception.108 But the TRIPS includes permissive exceptions that 
allow nations to not protect all prima facie patentable goods, and these 
exceptions were designed with pharmaceuticals in mind (given the fact that 
pharmaceuticals were the chief source of controversy at the time the TRIPS 
was negotiated) and are most often used in the pharmaceutical context. Most 
famously, Article 30 of the TRIPS states that “Members may provide 
limited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by a patent, provided 
that such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation 
106. TRIPS, supra note 103, art. 8.
107. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 Nov. 2001, WTO Doc. 
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 41 ILM 755 (2002) [hereinafter Doha]; TAUBMAN ET AL., supra note 
104, at 179–80. Article 4 of Doha states:
“We agree that the TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent members 
from taking measures to protect public health. Accordingly, while reiterating our 
commitment to the TRIPS Agreement, we affirm that the Agreement can and 
should be interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of WTO members’
right to protect public health and, in particular, to promote access to medicines for 
all.”
The fact that developing countries sought “a declaration recognizing their right to implement 
certain pro-competitive measures, notably compulsory licenses and parallel imports, as needed 
to enhance access to health care” and only secured Article 4 could undermine the import of 
health care under international trade law. CARLOS CORREA, IMPLICATIONS OF THE DOHA 
DECLARATION ON THE TRIPS AGREEMENTS AND PUBLIC HEALTH 9 (2002), http://
www.who.int/medicines/areas/policy/WHO_EDM_PAR_2002.3.pdf (last visited Oct. 4, 
2018). But recognizing limitations on the import of health care and the need to balance 
interests only undermines the case for a right to health care on a view of rights as “trumps” (to 
use language made famous in RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977)) 
seriously that is inconsistent with international human rights law and most contemporary 
scholarship on the nature of rights. Notably, however, the precise legal status of the Doha 
Declaration is contested. Duncan Matthews, WTO Decision on Implementation of Paragraph 
6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health: A Solution to the 
Access to Essential Medicines Problem?, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 73, 82–83 (2004).
108. TRIPS, supra note 103; TAUBMAN ET AL., supra note 104, at 98 (making this point 
in the case of medical technologies).
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of the patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of 
the patent owner, taking account of the legitimate interests of third parties,”
while Article 31 grants Members permission to pass laws allowing “for 
other use of the subject matter of a patent without the authorization of the 
right holder, including use by the government or third parties authorized by 
the government” subject to specified conditions.109
Controversy on how to interpret Article 30 continues.110 But it is clear 
that the exceptions cannot unreasonably conflict with normal exploitation of 
the patent or unreasonably conflict with the patent owner’s interest in such 
regular use.111 It is also clear that one can offer regulatory exceptions for the 
purposes of research and for obtaining marketing approval for a generic 
version of a patented good.112 This can speed up access to generic 
pharmaceuticals. The case on the use of Article 30 that established the test 
for compliance was explicitly designed to do so.113 Per that case, even when 
Article 30 exceptions are passed with only pharmaceuticals in mind and 
only pharmaceutical regulators can make use of them, they can pass World 
Trade Organization (“WTO”) scrutiny despite the ban on blanket exceptions 
for classes of goods so long as they do not solely apply to 
pharmaceuticals.114
Article 31, in turn, permits multiple exceptions to patent protections. 
Most notably, it permits nations to grant ‘compulsory licenses’ that allow 
third parties to produce patent products without the permission of the patent 
holder.115 Under the compulsory license regime,
the public interest goal of achieving broader access to the patented 
invention is considered more important than the private interest of 
the right holder in fully exploiting his exclusive rights. What this 
means in the context of public health imperatives is that 
109. Id. arts. 30–31.
110. Matthews, supra note 107, at 88–92.
111. Panel Report, Canada – Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS114/R (adopted Apr. 7, 2000) [hereinafter Canada]; TAUBMAN ET AL., supra note 
104, at 108; Fact Sheet, supra note 104. Part of the controversy discussed in Matthews, supra 
note 107, at 88–92 concerns the scope of the finding in that case. Some early interpreters read 
the exception as not allowing any commercial use of the final product and limiting the use to 
sole approval alone, but research purposes appear to also be allowed on the text of the case 
and subsequent interpretations listed in this footnote and subsequent practice discussed therein 
treat the case as having this effect.
112. Canada, supra note 111; see also Margaret K. Kyle & Anita M. McGahan, 
Investments in Pharmaceuticals Before and After TRIPS, 94 REV. ECON. & STAT. 1157, 1159 
(2012).
113. See generally Canada, supra note 111.
114. Id. ¶¶ 171–74.
115. Although the language of TRIPS does not explicitly refer to compulsory licenses, 
article 31 of TRIPS has been recognized as referring to these licenses; Fact Sheet, supra note 
104.
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compulsory licensing is intended to permit countries to produce 
generic drugs that are more affordable than patented proprietary 
medicines.116
Such rules are intended to have public health effects. The Doha Declaration 
on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health makes this clear.117 The 
declaration itself was partly a response to the issue of access to essential 
medicines that was brought into the center of public debate by a proposed 
suit from the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South Africa 
challenging compulsory licensing in that nation and by a contemporaneous 
dispute between Brazil and the United States of America at the WTO.118
Post-Doha, regional trade agreements can produce Article 31 exceptions 
under some circumstances,119 creating further possibilities for exceptions 
focused on ensuring access to health care.
Finally, under Article 27 of the TRIPS:
2. Members may exclude from patentability inventions, the 
prevention within their territory of the commercial exploitation of 
which is necessary to protect ordre public or morality, including to 
protect human, animal or plant life or health or to avoid serious 
prejudice to the environment, provided that such exclusion is not 
made merely because the exploitation is prohibited by their law.
3. Members may also exclude from patentability:
(a) diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods for the treatment 
of humans or animals; [and other items beyond the scope of this 
work.]120
The provisions concerning the protection of health could allow for even 
broader protections where health care is necessary for public order of 
morality. In practice,
[i]n their legislation, Members have generally understood that this 
permissible exclusion from patentability applies to methods for the 
treatment of humans or animals, not to medical or veterinary 
products, including devices, substances and compositions, for use 
in any of these methods. Under this approach, while a new and 
inventive way of removing a cataract from the eye may be excluded 
116. Matthews, supra note 107, at 77.
117. Doha, supra note 107.
118. Matthews, supra note 107, at 78–81.
119. TAUBMAN ET AL., supra note 104, at 190.
120. TRIPS, supra note 103, art 27.
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from patent protection, an instrument invented to perform this new 
surgical method would not be so excluded.121
Yet domestic legislation does not actually say how nations view the 
permissibility. Rather, it shows what they are willing to do in their own 
states. So, while this state practice is weak evidence of custom, it does not 
definitively determine the scope of Article 27 exceptions.122
These exceptions may not (and likely will not) perfectly promote access 
to health care. They are, rather, reflections of international trade law’s
commitment to the importance of health care. The value and potential of 
these exceptions as tools for actually increasing access to health care, 
especially medicines and particularly in low-income countries, are 
constantly questioned and remain contested.123 Shortly after the TRIPS, the 
state of the field could be described as follows:
Experts agree that there is space within the text of the agreement 
which, if exploited fully but responsibly, can help countries to 
safeguard their public good objectives with reference to availability 
of essential drugs, e.g. provisions of compulsory licensing, parallel 
imports, etc.124
Yet, even then, some questioned whether they would be so exploited. The 
empirical record since that time is mixed.125 But, as the forgoing made clear, 
121. TAUBMAN ET AL., supra note 104, at 103.
122. See also sources cited supra notes 7, 23.
123. See, for example, the following, which exemplify periodic recitals and discussions 
of pros and cons and propose their own reforms: Coenraad Visser, ‘Affordable Medicines’
Exceptions to Patent Rights Under the TRIPS Agreement: Some Pointers for South Africa?,
34 COMP. & INT’L L.J. S. AFR. 377 (2001); SISULE F. MUSUNGU ET AL., UTILIZING TRIPS
FLEXIBILITIES FOR PUBLIC HEALTH PROTECTION THROUGH SOUTH-SOUTH REGIONAL 
FRAMEWORKS (2004); Matthews, supra note 107; Richard D. Smith et al., Trade, TRIPS, and 
Pharmaceuticals, 373 LANCET 684 (2009); Ebenezer K. Tetteh, Pharmaceutical Innovation, 
Fair Following and the Constrained Value of TRIPS Flexibilities, 14 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP.
202 (2011); Anh L. T. Tran, Patent Law and Public Health Under the TRIPS Agreement 
Standards: How Does Vietnam Benefit from the WTO Membership?, 14 J. WORLD INTELL.
PROP. 334 (2011); Pradip Royhan, Market Access Challenges and Opportunities for 
Bangladesh Pharmaceutical Products Under TRIPS, 8 J. INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAC. 932 
(2013); Marumo Nkomo, The Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) -
Pharmaceuticals Transitional Period: Can It Help Build Capacity in African Least Developed 
Countries (LDCs)?, 10 INT’L J. AFR. RENAISSANCE STUD. 48 (2015).
124. Zafar Mirza, WTO/TRIPs, Pharmaceuticals and Health: Impacts and Strategies, 42 
DEV. 92, 96 (1999).
125. Flexibilities are rarely used. CORREA, supra note 107; MUSUNGU ET AL., supra
note 123. Doha, supra note 107, ¶ 6 arguably highlighted that this was the case for nations 
that lacked manufacturing capacities in 2001: “We recognize that WTO members with 
insufficient or no manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector could face difficulties 
in making effective use of compulsory licensing under the TRIPS Agreement. We instruct the 
Council for TRIPS to find an expeditious solution to this problem and to report to the General 
Council before the end of 2002.” It is not clear that this problem is solved in 2018, let alone 
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the exceptions are meant to ensure increased access to health care. 
International legal actors recognize that these norms are relevant to 
international human rights law. The connections between different areas of 
international law are particularly salient in the context of health care and 
trade. The WHO, the World Intellectual Property Organization (the 
“WIPO”), and the WTO work together to balance patent norms.126 The 
Human Rights Council, High Commissioner for Human Rights, and Human 
Rights Council-appointed special rapporteurs on a variety of rights all look 
at the TRIPS from a human rights perspective, often focusing on the right to 
health.127
One may argue that even subjecting pharmaceuticals to international 
trade law suggests that international law is hostile to the importance of 
pharmaceuticals. Regulating pharmaceuticals was one of the most 
controversial topics at the meetings that led to the TRIPS.128 Pharmaceutical 
companies led the charge for placing pharmaceuticals under patent 
regulations.129 Many critics suggest that recognizing that it is appropriate to 
place health care goods under international trade law’s patent provisions 
may undermine access to essential medicines.130 However, there is reason to 
think that patent protections could provide greater access to health care and 
improved health outcomes in the long-term.131 And even if this were not the 
case,132 recognizing that pharmaceuticals are and should be part of 
international trade law is consistent with acknowledging special priority for 
pharmaceuticals within that trade law regime. Indeed, international law 
highlights the importance of ensuring access to medicines, creating 
exceptions to the general rules on patents that tend to be applied to health 
law. Recognizing that health care is part of trade law may create some 
barriers to health care that would not exist in a fully unregulated 
international marketplace, but international trade law—and the international 
patent law that exists therein—exists, and its normativity is consistent with 
other provisions in its priority for protecting access to health care. In other 
that it was solved in 2002. This deadline was missed, much like the one identified in the 
Declaration of Alma-Ata, supra note 26 that I highlighted above.
126. TAUBMAN ET AL., supra note 104, at 195.
127. Id. at 216–17.
128. Mirza, supra note 124, at 93.
129. Id.
130. Royhan, supra note 123, at 932 (“A consensus has emerged among developing 
countries that the patent rights for pharmaceutical products guaranteed by TRIPS are a 
substantial barrier to the policy formulation for ensuring affordable access to medicines for 
their people”). But see Nkomo, supra note 123, at 63 (noting that these arguments were 
adduced well before developing nations were required to recognize pharmaceutical patents 
and were thus raised well before any empirical evidence could even support them).
131. Mirza, supra note 124, at 93–94, raises this possibility, though he was unable to 
empirically measure it in 1999.
132. See, for example, Kyle & McGahan, supra note 112, at 1157, for evidence that it 
does not increase innovation sensitive to the needs of developing countries.
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words, if international trade law is going to exist in this domain, global 
leaders recognize that its negative impacts on access to health care must be 
minimized. Exceptions to the general rules on patents follow suit.133
One could argue that these exceptions are political concessions rather 
than indications of the primary importance of health care in international 
trade law, let alone international law simpliciter. But the argument from 
coherence takes the law as given and seeks to explain it in a normatively 
acceptable way. An argument from historical origins would have a different 
form. It is, of course, true that all international laws have political origins. 
The recognition of social, cultural, and political rights was itself 
contentious. Different covenants for different kinds of rights were
themselves a compromise.134 To the extent that any international covenants 
are normative—despite being the products of international politics—the 
same is true of the exceptions to international trade law. The current task is 
to render the product of these political practices normatively explicable.135
The international trade component of the coherence argument is, 
admittedly, more ambitious than the components focused on international 
human rights law and human rights norms. The international trade law 
component particularly faces a structural counterargument that other 
components do not face, but that counterargument can be overcome. In 
short, the counterargument suggests that one cannot build a positive right 
out of negative derogations clauses like those in the TRIPS (or the GATT). 
While international human rights law produces explicit equality and non-
discrimination rights and freedoms that can plausibly be used to develop a 
positive right to health care, the international trade law passages I identify
do not create any rights or even positive obligations. You cannot, a critic 
may charge, create a positive out of a negative. The easiest way to avoid this 
criticism is to deny the positive/negative rights and duties distinction. Many 
133. I grant that additional conditions on trade outside the WTO framework have led 
many nations to require “TRIPS-plus requirements” for continued trade, which undermine 
efforts to prioritize drugs. Smith et al., supra note 123, at 687–88; Kevin Outterson, Fair 
Followers: Expanding Access to Generic Pharmaceuticals for Low- and Middle-Income 
Populations, in THE POWER OF PILLS 164 (Jillian C. Cohen et al. eds., 2006). This does not 
change the fact that international law’s main components recognize the importance of health 
care and see access to health care as an important interest against which they must weigh the 
goal of innovation, which is itself important partly due to its ability to provide new and better 
health care.
134. For good discussions of these historical controversies that emphasize the 
controversies’ impact on the right to health, see THE RIGHT TO HEALTH AS A HUMAN RIGHT 
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Brigit Toebes et al. eds., 1999); JOHN TOBIN, THE RIGHT TO 
HEALTH IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2012).
135. For a similar method, see MACKLEM, supra note 7.
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scholars do so when arguing for positive rights.136 But, as I note elsewhere, 
that distinction is valuable elsewhere (particularly in ethics).137
Fortunately, a less problematic response is possible and plausible. I am 
unclear on why one would think that a positive cannot be built out of a 
negative more generally. But this paper relies only on a commitment to the 
view that one can recognize both positive rights and negative liberties as 
reflective of values. Where the rights and liberties are supposed to exist as 
part of a unified whole, expressions of value underlying a liberty can be 
used to support a right and vice versa. Moreover, we should want the 
normative order underlying the whole to be coherent and should read 
provisions of law in a manner consistent with underlying values of other 
areas of law. The coherence argument suggests that international human 
rights law and international trade law alike acknowledge the primary import 
of health care for reasons that are not strictly concerned with increased 
health outcomes at the population level. This supports reading the right to 
health in a manner with similarly multifaceted aims. Such a reading 
supports a right to health care. While the commitment to the primary import 
of health care in international trade law is a less explicitly normative 
commitment than international human rights law’s commitment to the value 
of dignity, I provided textual support that supports at least an implicit 
commitment to this view. Not all underlying values of international law will 
be identifiable, and they will conflict, but one should attempt to identify as 
many as possible and to make them as coherent as possible. Recognition of 
an international right to health care is consistent with such an approach.
International trade law too, then, recognizes the importance of health 
care. Recognizing its import in our interpretation of the right to health and 
creating a right to health care as part of that broader right coheres with this 
international trade law norm. As noted above, such recognition also coheres 
with other parts of international human rights law, such as its recognition of 
dignity, equality, and non-discrimination rights and its statements that all 
these rights and the right to health are indivisible. This is the coherence 
argument for the international right to health care.
IV. The Moral Value Of Recognition
As demonstrated above, recognition of an international right to health 
care is supported by both the text of international human rights law 
documents and the underlying normative structure that appears to undergird 
international law. Recognition of such a right is thus valuable for making 
sense of the content of international law and establishing its coherence. 
Where we desire a normatively coherent international legal order, either as a 
136. STEPHEN HOLMES & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COSTS OF RIGHTS (1999).
137. Michael Da Silva, Review Essay: Jeff King, Judging Social Rights, 9 VIENNA J.
INT’L CONST. L. 463, 470 n.47 (2015).
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means of establishing its general authority or for its own sake, this alone 
provides reason to think that recognition of an international right to health 
care is not only necessary as a means of positive international human rights 
law, but normatively desirable.
Still, other moral reasons also count in favor of recognizing the right. 
The argument in this paper primarily concerns the positive law. A full moral 
case for rights to health care outside the realm of international law is beyond 
the scope of this piece. Yet there are other moral reasons to recognize such a 
right as a matter of international law. It is worth briefly mentioning them 
here. Their importance is then further developed in Parts V and VI, in which 
I explain how this approach avoids the problems in Part I and some of the 
most damning lingering objections to my argument.
First, recognition is morally valuable for expressive purposes. If the 
forgoing is correct, then recognition of an international right to health care 
is also valuable as a means of explicitly highlighting our commitments to 
other important moral values, such as dignity, equality, and non-
discrimination. International recognition of the importance of the means of 
realizing these values, in addition to international recognition of the values 
as subjects of standalone rights, is a further sign of commitment to their 
importance. There is thus good reason to recognize an international right to 
health care.
Second, recognizing the international right to health care is desirable 
insofar as it presents clear, achievable action items for realizing human 
rights. As noted above, it is difficult to outline the scope of the right to 
health’s social determinant components, the exact nature of its attendant 
duties, and the extent to which given interventions contribute to realization 
thereof. Given the wide range of social determinants of health, it seems like 
we need to change the very structure of the world to fully realize the right to 
health. While some people believe it is easier to change society than to 
change individuals, the same people recognize that this appears utopian.138
Even if it is not impossible, it makes it difficult to determine where to start. 
We should not let the perfect be the enemy of the good and mistake the 
potential impossibility of fully realizing the right to health with the non-
existence of duties to fulfill it. But we also need to know where to begin and 
how to know if we are contributing to improved realization thereof. The 
strong comparison requirement in the second problem above combined with 
the causation concerns in the previous paragraph would make this very 
difficult. The international right to health care, by contrast, specifies 
measurable goods that must be provided to fulfill the right. The number of 
goods that are absolutely required for dignity concerns is sufficiently small 
as to be potentially realizable. Health care thus provides an easy starting 
point in a longer path toward improved human rights realization. While we 
must be careful not to misplace priorities, the limited scope of the 
138. See, e.g., Marmot, supra note 40, at S21.
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international right to health care’s core avoids the worst parts of this 
concern (as I detail below).
Third, recognition is morally valuable insofar as it requires 
governments to provide the goods necessary for a minimally dignified 
existence. Recognition can be an actual tool for ensuring more people live 
dignified lives, which would be a moral good. International human rights 
law’s weak normative status in some jurisdictions and its lack of an 
enforcement mechanism limits this potential value of recognition. But 
providing additional legal tools for bringing people up to the level of well-
being necessary for dignity can be helpful and could be a means of helping 
realize other important moral ends, including the realization of other, less 
controversial human rights. Likewise, fourth, an international human right 
to health care can be a tool for health care justice insofar as international 
legal arguments are seen in some way as persuasive in the jurisdiction in 
question.
Fifth, recognition of an international right to health care makes 
international human rights law consistent with global transnational norms. A 
majority of world constitutions now recognize a right to health care.139 Many 
people in nations without constitutional health rights believe they have a 
right to health care.140 International recognition of such a right can provide 
guidance on how to understand these domestic rights as part of a larger 
transnational legal process and makes sense of right to health care claims 
outside the nations that explicitly recognize such a right in their 
constitutions. As I argue elsewhere, the form of this apparent international 
right to health care is actually consistent with the normatively acceptable 
claims made by health rights litigants throughout the globe, suggesting that 
international recognition is already part and parcel of a global health rights 
phenomenon.141
Finally, recognition avoids some of the conceptual problems facing the 
right to health care. For instance, it explains how one can have a right that 
does not fit the traditional claim-right model. If the long history of the right 
to health is, in part, a history of a workable right to health care that does not 
139. Eleanor D. Kinney, The International Right to Health: What Does It Mean for Our 
Nation and World?, 34 IND. L. REV 1457, 1464–65 (2001); Eleanor D. Kinney & Brian 
Alexander Clark, Provisions for Health and Health Care in the Constitutions of the Countries 
of the World, 37 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 285, 291 (2004); Courtney Jung et al., Economic and 
Social Rights in National Constitutions, 62 Am. J. Comp. L. 1034, 1054 (2014).
140. For example, many Canadians believe they have a right to health care. ROY J
ROMANOW, COMM’N ON THE FUTURE OF HEALTH CARE IN CAN., BUILDING ON VALUES:
THE FUTURE OF HEALTH CARE IN CANADA 243 (2002). The Canadian statute guaranteeing 
public health is accordingly critical to the self-identity of many Canadian citizens. Colleen M. 
Flood & Michelle Zimmerman, Judicious Choices: Health Care Resource Decisions and the 
Supreme Court, in HEALTH LAW AT THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA 25 (Jocelyn Downie 
& Elaine Gibson eds., 2007).
141. Da Silva, Realizing the Right to Health Care in Canada, supra note 1; Da Silva, A 
Goal-Oriented Understanding, supra note 99.
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fit the claim-right model, this is some evidence that there can be rights that 
do not fit that model.142
With these reasons in mind, I now turn to discuss how recognition of 
the right in the manner described above addresses the specific conceptual 
problems facing the international right to health care detailed above.
V. Solving The Problems With A Right To Health Care
The forgoing account helps avoid each of the three problems facing the 
international right to health care that I identified in Part I. The first concern 
is most easily avoided. In short, the forgoing grants that the majority of 
provisions outlining the international right to health focus on social 
determinants of health, but simply responds by noting that there is a 
consequential minority of provisions that highlight entitlements to specific 
health care goods and to the fair distribution of health care goods. One 
cannot ignore these provisions in a good faith interpretation of the law and 
should try to make sense of their inclusion in international law. 
Acknowledging them as health care components of the right to health makes 
the most sense. Recognizing an international right to health care is 
necessary to acknowledge the many health care-related provisions of 
international human rights law.
The forgoing also addresses the second problem facing a right to health 
care. If the international right to health care is not understood as solely 
concerned with increasing health at the population level, then its 
comparatively weak ability to improve such health outcomes will not 
unduly limit its scope. If the right is understood as focused on both 
improving health at the population level and ensuring that individuals can 
live a minimally dignified existence, then the right need not be overly 
expansive, running into the motivating animus between the second problem 
above. Recognizing a right to health care need not be monolithic on this 
construction. It accordingly need not lead to misplaced priorities that ignore 
the importance of social determinants of health as contributors to the 
important right to health.
One issue with this response to the second problem lingers, but it can be 
addressed. The forgoing does suggest that a health care entitlement does not 
142. Granted, other international rights that do not fit this model provide the same 
evidence, but it is helpful for health rights advocates to have proof that non-traditional health 
rights can work. The preceding is not an exhaustive list of moral arguments for why 
recognition of an international right to health care is justified. It is certainly not an exhaustive 
list of reasons for why we recognize health care rights generally, why health care has any 
special moral status, or even why we should care about it given the relative value of health 
care and the social determinants of health. But it is a strong set of arguments for my narrower 
claim. The literature on the broader topic is vast. For an interesting recent piece that takes a 
different tack on the last point, see Gabriele Badano, Still Special, Despite Everything: A 
Liberal Defence of the Value of Healthcare in the Face of the Social Determinants of Health,
42 SOC. THEORY & PRAC. 183 (2016).
Fall 2018] International Right to Health Care 377
need to be comparatively better than social determinants of health in 
contributing to health. Insofar as health is necessary for dignity, we might 
think that this account cannot avoid the second concern, even if it is 
primarily concerned with dignity. After all, if the social determinants are 
better contributors to health, they would be better contributors to dignity by 
extension. One could counter this by noting that the right to health’s
emphasis on social determinants of health highlights its focus on population 
health while dignity addresses the health of individuals. Such a statement is 
likely true. Yet, ultimately, a healthy environment is even more likely to 
produce healthy individuals. So, one must deny the strict comparison 
requirement for rights realization upon which the strongest version of the 
second problem rests. Luckily, however, international human rights law 
does not generally include this requirement. Indeed, the provisions above 
guaranteeing specific health care entitlements would be nonsensical if such 
a requirement existed. My account’s denial of the comparison requirement 
is thus supported by international human rights law, and I can deny the 
existence of the purported requirement in order to properly address the 
second problem above.
The approach above also avoids the third concern. While the 
international right to health care does require a minimally functioning health 
care system, international human rights law is generally agnostic as to the 
form that this system would take, allowing the right to coexist with the 
fundamental norms of state sovereignty undergirding international law more 
broadly. This agnosticism also highlights the way in which the health care 
system requirement is only a part of the broader right. The right is otherwise 
structurally identical to other economic, cultural, and social rights. Where 
the international right to health care is understood as a complex right with 
multiple components, it can survive the challenge that one component fails 
to accord with the structure of other rights. If all rights are similarly 
complex and/or all rights otherwise share the same structure, then the 
international right to health care could survive without its systemic 
component even if the third challenge hit its mark.
Yet there are also signs that other rights share the purportedly 
anomalous systemic duty element of the international human right to health 
care and good reason to think that this feature should be a component of 
international rights. The right to water is a good example of a right that 
shares the right to health care’s structure. The right to water is not only 
rooted in dignity, but is also connected with other rights, such as the rights 
to health and food.143 Its scope is not only limited to “the provision of 
adequate nutritious foods and clean drinking water,”144 something that 
arguably requires a water management system for realization. It also 
explicitly includes “ensuring that disadvantaged and marginalized farmers, 
143. GC 15, supra note 94, ¶¶ 1, 3, 6.
144. Id. ¶ 4 (quoting CRC, supra note 5, art. 24, ¶ 2).
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including women farmers, have equitable access to water and water 
management systems, including sustainable rain harvesting and irrigation 
technology” and “the right to a system of water supply and management that 
provides equality of opportunity for people to enjoy the right to water.”145
The right clearly requires establishing a functioning water supply and 
management system, which is analogous to the right to a functioning health 
care system as part of the international right to health’s health care 
component. It also recognizes the need for national strategies and policies. 
The authoritative interpretation guarantees:
sufficient recognition of this right within the national political and 
legal systems, preferably by way of legislative implementation; 
adopting a national water strategy and plan of action to realize this 
right; ensuring that water is affordable for everyone; and 
facilitating improved and sustainable access to water, particularly 
in rural and deprived urban areas.146
This is remarkably similar to the passage preferring legislative 
entrenchment of national health care systems and national health care 
policies and strategies in GC 14.147 As with the seeming international right 
to health care, moreover, the right to water is not solely systematic in nature. 
It also includes a minimum floor of individualized content. For instance, the 
CESCR’s authoritative interpretation of the right to water states that “[t]he 
elements of the right to water must be adequate for human dignity, life and 
health.”148 This dignity-based adequacy threshold keeps the right from being 
monolithic. Procedural safeguards above this minimum are also present.149
From this perspective, the right to health care appears to fit a shared 
structure of new international human rights that is complex in nature, 
recognizing a minimal floor of content, procedural fairness above it, and the 
need to create a full system as a means of ensuring realization of the other 
components. It is not only the case that the right to health care is not unique 
in its structure. It is further the case that the right is in the vanguard of a new 
form of rights recognition and that this vanguard does not fundamentally 
undermine the established structure of rights insofar as it is consistent with 
well-recognized CESCR practice. From this perspective, for instance, the 
right to food is an outlier in not requiring a system of distributing food, and 
this unique feature can be partially explained by the fact that people can 
feed themselves from the land; any right to a system as part of the right to 
145. Id. ¶¶ 7, 10.
146. Id. ¶ 26; see also id. ¶ 47 (requiring a “national strategy or plan of action”). As with 
the right to health care, such a strategy must have indicators and benchmarks. See id. ¶¶ 53–
54.
147. GC 14, supra note 7, ¶ 36.
148. GC 15, supra note 94, ¶ 11.
149. E.g., id. ¶¶ 10, 12–16.
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food is thus a backstop against a failure to protect the natural resources 
needed to feed one’s self.150 That right actually does include a requirement 
to create a food strategy that speaks to how any system in place will 
operate,151 so there is more consistency between the structure of that right 
and the structure of the right to health than one might think on first reading 
of the relevant law.
But one does not need to subscribe to this more radical view to avoid 
the third problem above. All that is needed to address the third problem is to 
show that some other rights fit this form, and so a right to health care built 
on the health care-related statements articulating the right to health would 
not be a complete outlier in international human rights law. Comparison 
with the right to water, for one, establishes this more modest claim.152
It is also worth noting that the right to health arguably runs into the 
third problem even if one takes a social determinants-focused approach to 
the right to health. The Rio Political Declaration on the Social Determinants 
of Health included “effective systems of preventing and treating ill health”
among the social factors that cause health inequities and explicitly 
highlighted “a universal, comprehensive, equitable, effective, responsive 
and accessible health care system” as a requirement for good health.153 This 
passage is not only further evidence in support of the textual argument 
above. It also establishes the need for a health care system as part of the 
right to health. So even if we do not recognize an international right to 
health care as part of the right to health, we need to recognize a right to a 
functioning health care system as part of the international right to health. If 
the third problem above undermines the right to health care, it should also 
undermine the right to health. But we cannot avoid recognizing the right to 
health as a matter of international law. From a positive law perspective, 
then, we should not recognize the third problem as undermining the case for 
a right to health care. Health rights appear to have required systemic 
components.154
150. Food GC, supra note 71, ¶ 12.
151. Id. ¶ 25.
152. Of course, the right to water is not in the ICESCR or other canonical human rights 
documents. See, e.g., UDHR, supra note 78, ICESCR, supra note 5, and International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 
171. Drawing on an analogy with a contested right to establish a contested right is less than 
ideal. But the CESCR clearly now recognizes the right to water and a right to health care, and 
the CESCR’s interpretations are authoritative human rights law documents. Moreover, I 
present ample other reason to recognize a right to health care above. If one does not accept 
CESCR statements as authoritative in the first place, then the third problem with a right to 
health care likely does not arise. The best textual evidence for a systemic component of the 
international right to health care is in GC 14. As noted above, the respect, protect, and fulfill 
doctrine also provides some support, if not full support, for the systemic requirement.
153. Rio Declaration, supra note 22, at 48, ¶¶ 6–7.
154. Notably, the provision of sanitation services as part of the right to water is also 
considered part of the right to health. See GC 15, supra note 94, ¶ 29. Insofar as this too 
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VI. Objections And Replies
Positive international human rights law is enormous and controversial. 
It is likely that every argument in this domain is open to numerous 
objections. My argument for the international right to health care above is 
no different. In this final section, I address some of the most damning 
potential criticisms.
A. One Cannot Properly Identify the Content of an 
International Right to Health Care
The first objection one might raise is that articulating the scope of a 
right to health care is problematic in its own right and likely impossible. 
Elsewhere, I identified four challenges facing any attempt to fill the content 
of a right to health care (in ethics or law): (1) “the argument from the nature 
of rights” (“there can be no right to health care because no one owes a duty 
to fulfill that right”), (2) “the problem of scope” (it is difficult to set a non-
arbitrary stopping point between an overly expansive right to all health care 
goods and a specific right to one health care good), (3) “the problem of 
principles of scope” (“it is difficult to articulate a principle for selecting 
which goods ought to be covered”), and (4) “the problem of time and space”
(“the list of goods required to fulfill a right to health will vary over time and 
space as new goods are developed,” so it is difficult to specify the content at 
any given time in any given place).155 These are genuine problems for a 
moral conception of the right to health care. But they are not damning 
problems for the international right to health care or the textual and moral 
arguments for such a right presented above.
Regardless of whether one thinks that a right to health care can avoid 
these problems generally—and I argue that it can elsewhere156—the 
international right to health care deals with them admirably. It states that 
governments owe the chief corresponding primary duties of the right to 
health care (and specifies some circumstances where non-state actors may 
owe them).157 It further specifies that developed nations will have specific 
duties to assist developing nations fulfill their duties.158 It articulates which 
goods are included in the list, avoiding the expansive end of the problem of 
scope, and updates specific lists of what counts as, for instance, ‘essential 
medicines,’ thereby avoiding the problem of space and time. The 
requirement for procedural safeguards for health care allocations above the 
requires a sanitation system, the right to health may have non-health care-based systemic 
elements too.
155. Da Silva, Realizing the Right to Health Care in Canada, supra note 1; Da Silva, A 
Goal-Oriented Understanding, supra note 99, at 379–82.
156. See, e.g., id.
157. GC 14, supra note 7, ¶¶ 63–65.
158. Id. ¶ 40.
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minimum floor set out in the WHO’s Model List of Essential Medicines,159
for example, avoids the narrow end of the problem of scope by allowing the 
required entitlements to go beyond the goods explicitly listed in 
international laws. The coherence argument above specifies principles for 
decision-making that help avoid the problem of principles of scope in 
general; a commitment to normative coherence is itself a principle that helps 
avoid this third problem.
Even if the claims in the last paragraph were not true, it is notable that 
the international right to health faces the same problems. Indeed, it likely 
faces them to an even larger extent since the goods required to fulfill an 
expansive version of the right are potentially astronomically expensive. A 
healthy environment will be expensive indeed, and the duty to provide it is 
even more diffuse than the duty to provide health care. These problems, 
then, are no worse for the right to health care than for the broader right to 
health, suggesting that this objection would prove too much, undermining 
the case for the right to health that clearly exists as a matter of positive 
international human rights law.
B. The Nature of Rights Suggests There Cannot Be a 
Right to Health Care
The same thing can be said of the second objection one can lodge 
against the international right to health care, which states that discussing a 
right to health care misunderstands the nature of rights.160 This is, in part, a 
simple restatement and expansion of the argument from the nature of rights 
above. In short, it says that a right to health care cannot be fulfilled by any 
candidate duty-holder. Where all rights entail correlative duties, and duties 
can only exist where they are at least conceivably possible to fulfill, it is 
difficult to explain how a right to health care can be a right. Yet, again, the 
duties under an international right to health care are more easily discernible 
and achievable than a right to health. It is easier to provide insulin than a 
healthy environment (and easier to measure insulin provision than it is to 
measure provision of a healthy environment and each country’s contribution 
thereto).161
Moreover, even if we grant that an international right to health care 
does not fit the traditional claim-right model of rights where rights must 
have achievable correlative duties, one cannot ignore the fact that 
international human rights law recognizes a variety of rights that do not fit 
this model, including the aforementioned rights to health, a healthy 
environment, and water. International human rights law may have a unique 
structure for rights that does not fit the traditional model. Even if this 
159. WHO Model List of Essential Medicines, 20th List, supra note 91.
160. Sreenivasan, supra note 11, at 240.
161. Recall that Sreenivasan lodges his argument from the nature of rights against the 
broader right to health. Id.
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undermines the moral case for such rights (and I think there is reason to 
think not all rights must fit that model),162 it does not undermine the case for 
a right to health care as a matter of positive international human rights law.
C. The International Right to Health Care 
Does Not Appear to Be a Single Right
This relates to the third possible objection I will address here—namely, 
that the right articulated in international human rights law appears to be a 
catchall term for a variety of claims that is not easily discernible as a right to 
a particular thing, rather than a standalone right. As noted above, the 
international human right to health care seems to require provision of 
essential goods, fairness in health care allocation decisions concerning other 
goods, and a functioning health care system.163 These purported entitlements 
are related, but they are not identical. Once one acknowledges that not all 
rights fit the traditional model, however, the complex nature of the right to 
health care is no longer problematic. Indeed, many rights seem to fit this 
complex form. Again, recall my discussion of the right to water to see how 
even the structural component of the international right to health care is not 
unique. If we think this is morally problematic, we can again appeal to 
international human rights law’s general structure and note that positive 
international human rights law happily acknowledges other non-standard 
rights as a matter of positive law. Indeed, international human rights law’s
claim that all international human rights are indivisible actually supports the 
idea that no international human right is going to have uniquely discernible 
content and duties. If all rights entail all other rights, each right is going to 
require the provision of more than just the goods clearly specified in the 
articulation of each. Each will thus become complex in nature when we 
fully specify its content. This may leave philosophers unhappy, but it is an 
entailment of positive international human rights law, and my argument 
here is limited to the case for a right to health care in positive international 
human rights law.
D. The Link between Dignity and Health Care Requires More Evidence
A fourth objection states that the coherence argument makes the 
international right to health care remain purely instrumental in nature. 
Having conceded that health care provision may only weakly correlate with 
improved health, and a right to health care that is purely instrumental to 
162. See Da Silva, Realizing the Right to Health Care in Canada, supra note 1, ch. 2. A 
more sustained discussion of this point is the topic of another manuscript on which I am 
presently working.
163. I make the general case for an alternative structure for rights to health care in Da 
Silva, A Goal-Oriented Understanding, supra note 99 .at 385 and in Da Silva, Realizing the 
Right to Health Care in Canada, supra note 1, ch. 2 and 3. The work-in-progress in id.
addresses whether this structure can be generalized.
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improved health at a population level will be severely limited, I stated that it 
is instrumental to achieving dignity without demonstrating the type of 
strong correlation between access to health care and dignity that would 
properly ground the right. One may further state that I failed to establish the 
independent case for the intrinsic value of a right to health care. While I 
provided standalone textual evidence for the existence of a right to health 
care in the textual argument above, this objection has merit. It is true that 
my case for health care as a necessary condition for a dignified life is non-
scientific and is instead based on common sense and predictions about how 
not being able to access medicines, vaccines, and other health care goods, 
even outside the public health domain, could render one unable to access 
their other rights. It is also true that this focus on dignity makes the right 
primarily instrumental.
I do not think this is a problem with my account. One does not need to 
rehearse social science evidence to make the instrumental case for health 
care as a means of ensuring dignity, and an instrumental right can still be a 
right as a matter of international human rights law, particularly where we 
recognize that all rights are indivisible and will at times be realized as 
instrumental to other rights. Moreover, this instrumental character of the 
international right helps constrain the content of the right and avoid the 
problem of scope. Finally, the procedural components of the right to health 
care are not instrumental to equality but are non-instrumental aspects of 
equality.
E. The Indivisibility of Human Rights Could Still Cut Against 
My Account
The final objection I will address was highlighted above. The worry that 
international human rights law fails to recognize a right to health care 
lingers. The fact that all rights are connected could still easily cut against 
my argument. An explicitly binding statement that there is a right to health 
care is lacking in international human rights law. The lack of recognition of 
an explicit right to health care could be evidence that it must be part of the 
right to health. If the right to health is going to avoid redundancy, it must 
provide some unique content to the indivisible mass of international human 
rights. A right to health care is a clear candidate. After all, rights to most of 
the other social determinants already exist elsewhere in the legal order. Yet 
I must admit that there is a textual argument from absence and indivisibility 
against recognition of an international right to health care. I simply maintain 
that the other arguments given in favor of it outweigh this argument against 
it.
Conclusion
While international human rights law does not explicitly recognize a 
right to health care, the texts supporting the international right to health 
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support recognition of such a right in a way that is not reducible to 
recognizing such a right only when it is more instrumentally valuable for 
improving health outcomes at the population level than alternatives. Health 
care is also necessary for realizing other international rights. So, health care 
provision is instrumentally necessary for recognition of these other goods. 
This suggests that there is a health care component to other international 
rights. International human rights law is thus most coherent where it 
recognizes a right to health care. This coherence argument is further 
strengthened by international trade law’s recognition of the primacy of 
health care goods among other intellectual goods: international law as a 
whole is most coherent when it recognizes health care as a good important 
enough to ground a right. These arguments for recognition of a right to 
health care deal with the most damaging critiques of the concept of an 
international right to health care. Most lingering objections apply equally to 
the international right to health. There is, then, good reason to acknowledge 
the existence of an international right to health care as a matter of positive 
law.
